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Analysis of spectrum allocation policies in the economics literature focuses on 
competitive bidding for wireless licenses.  Auctions generating high bids, as in Germany and the 
UK, are identified as “successful,” while those producing lower receipts, as in Switzerland and 
the Netherlands, are deemed “fiascoes.”  Yet, even full and costless extraction of license rents 
does not map directly to social welfare, because spectrum policies creating rents impose social 
costs.   For example, rules favoring monopoly market structure predictably increase license 
values, but reduce welfare.  This paper attempts to shift analytical focus to the relationship 
between spectrum policy (including license auctions) and efficiency in output markets.  In cross-
country comparisons of performance metrics in mobile telephone service markets, empirical 
estimates suggest that countries that auction licenses do not achieve lower prices or higher levels 
of output than other nations.  Rather, countries allocating greater bandwidth to licensed operators 
and achieving more competitive market structures realize demonstrable social welfare benefits.  
These gains generally dominate efficiencies associated with license sales.  Policies to increase 
auction revenues, such as reservation prices and subsidies for weak bidders, should be evaluated 
in this light. 
    1
A Welfare Analysis of Spectrum Allocation Policies 




  The introduction of competitive bidding to assign wireless licenses constitutes a 
substantial policy advance.  Following their suggestion by Leo Herzel (1951) and Ronald 
Coase (1959), auctions were advocated by numerous economists (e.g., Levin 1962), 
policy experts (Pool 1983), and policymakers (Fowler & Brenner 1982).  Competitive 
bidding was finally adopted by New Zealand in 1989 (Crandall 1998), India in 1991 (Jain 
2001), and the United States in 1993 (McMillan 1994).  At least twenty-five other 
countries have instituted license auctions in recent years (Hazlett 2004).   
  The argument for using the “price system” to allocate wireless licenses is 
premised on three sources of efficiencies: 
 
  (a) elimination of rent dissipation associated with “comparative hearings” or 
“beauty contest” awards (Kwerel & Felker 1985);  
  (b) assignment of licenses to the most productive suppliers, saving the costs of 
secondary market reassignments (Cramton 2002, 608);  
  (c) generation of revenues for public use, funds which could displace activity-
distorting taxes; the consensus estimate is that $0.33 in social cost is saved for 
every dollar not raised by taxes (Cramton 2001, 48; Klemperer 2002b, 179).
1 
 
  A healthy literature on the implementation of auctions has emerged, focusing on 
the efficiency of rival bidding mechanisms.
2  Here, the revenues raised by government 
auctions are seen both as indicators of auction design efficiency and as appropriated 
surplus that increases social welfare by offsetting activity-distorting taxes.  Consequently, 
                                                 
1   Cramton (2002, 608) cites a range of 17-56 cents, relying on Ballard et al., 1985.   
2   See McMillan 1994, McAfee & McMillan 1996, Cramton 1995, 2002; Moreton & Spiller 1998; Grimm 
et al. 2001; Wolfstetter 2001; Binmore & Klemperer 2002; Van Damme 2002; Klemperer 2002a, 2002b.      2
auction success is measured by license receipts.
3  The auctions producing relatively high 
bids in the U.K. and Germany are widely identified as “successes,” while license sales 
producing far lower revenues in Switzerland or the Netherlands are deemed “fiascoes.”
4   
 This  revenue centric approach assumes that license assignments are independent 
of underlying spectrum allocations.  The logic is diagrammed in Figure I.1.  Policy 
makers allocate bandwidth for particular services in Stage 1 -- “spectrum allocation.”  In 
this, policy makers create wireless licenses, and in so doing, set forth rules that largely 
determine how the market will be structured and how efficiently operators will perform.  
This includes such policy choices as how many competitive operators to license, rules to 
limit or facilitate license aggregation, rules governing interconnection of networks, 
technology and service mandates, and the determination of which frequencies are 
allocated to the licenses.   In Stage 2 the licensee rights created in Stage 1 are distributed 
to service providers – “license assignment.”
5   Ultimately, wireless services are provided 
by licensees to consumers, generating economic welfare in Stage 3.   
    Formal economic analysis has focused on Stage 2, scrutinizing alternative 
bidding mechanisms.  Of this approach, Paul Klemperer has recently written: “What 
really matters in auction design are the same issues that any industry regulator would 
recognize as key concerns: discouraging collusive, entry-deterring and predatory 
behavior. … By contrast, most of the extensive auction literature … is of second-order 
importance for practical auction design” (Klemperer 2002b, 169).
6   This approach, “just 
good undergraduate industrial organization (Ibid.),” is suggested for auction design, 
which it assuredly assists.  But an essential analytical conflict is left intact:  auction rules 
that alter market structure or operator performance produce Stage 3 welfare effects, and 
these spillovers are not systematically accounted for. 
                                                 
3   It is customary to adjust receipts by bandwidth allocated licenses and the population of the franchise 
area, such that prices are quoted in terms of “$ per MHz per pop.” 
4   Klemperer (2002a, 841) identifies the British auction as “successful,” while rating auctions in Austria, 
Netherlands and Switzerland as “fiascoes.”  The auction in the Netherlands is rated a “miserable failure” in 
Binmore & Klemperer (2002, C93).   
5  This theoretical separation is facilitated by the use of the term “spectrum auction,” which implies that 
what is being sold is a natural resource, a physical commodity exogenously defined.   We employ what we 
hope is a less confusing terminology, referring to “wireless license auctions.”  See discussion in Hazlett 
2001, 402-407. 
6  Support for this view is also supplied in Klemperer & Binmore 2002 and Klemperer 2002a.    3
  For instance, economists often advocate improving license auctions by imposing 
reservation prices,
7 extending credits to “weak bidders,”
8 and restricting the number of 
licenses (to increase scarcity value).
9  In addition, the social discount rate is ignored in 
auction processes that delay productive use of frequencies for months or years.
10  Each 
implicates spectrum allocation rules (Stage 1), and alters final market outcomes (Stage 3).  
Yet, policies are evaluated on the incremental revenues they extract in license bids.
11 
  The problem is put into perspective with some simple estimates of social value.  
Empirical research suggests that annual consumer surplus associated with U.S. cellular 
telephone licenses is at least ten times as large as annual producers’ surplus.
12  Policies 
undertaken to improve license revenues, then, focus on a small fraction of the economic 
value at stake.
13  Rules that increase auction bids but risk collateral damage – say, by 
reducing operator efficiency or market competitiveness – are not properly evaluated by 
reference to rent extraction alone.  This is true even when revenues raised by license 
auctions do, ceteris paribus, increase welfare.  
  Extending the Klemperer critique, we argue that economists must not only pay 
attention to market structure issues within auction design, investigations of license 
assignment efficiency should be nested within an analysis of wireless output markets.  
                                                 
7   See Cramton (2002), Krishna (2002) or Klemperer (2002a). 
8   See Ayres & Cramton (1996), Rothkopf et al. (2003). 
9   See Wolfstetter (2001), van Damme (2002), Rothkopf & Bazelon (2003). 
10 Binmore & Klemperer (2002, C90) note that a three year planning phase was used to good cause in 
crafting the U.K. 3G auctions, without accounting for the relevant welfare trade-offs. 
11  In a standard treatment, Peter Cramton (2002, 631) explicitly notes the “two steps in making spectrum 
available to companies.”  He goes on to write: “Arguably, the greatest economic gains will come from 
better allocation of spectrum, rather than from improved methods of assigning the spectrum.  This is 
because current spectrum auctions already are highly efficient.  In contrast spectrum allocations often are 
far from efficient.”  We agree with the conclusion, but disagree with the rationale.  Even where license 
auctions are not in place the largest efficiency gains come from improved spectrum allocation.  Our instant 
point, however, is that the relationship between auction (Stage 2) and allocation (Stage 1) is not properly 
integrated.  On the analysis of spectrum allocation policy per se, see Rosston & Steinberg (1997), White 
(2000), Hazlett (2001), Owen & Rosston (2001), Kwerel & Williams (2002), Faulhaber & Farber (2002), 
and Hazlett (2003). 
12  Greg Rosston writes: “Hausman (1997) has estimated that the introduction of cellular created consumer 
surplus on the order of $30 to $50 billion per year. In Rosston (1994), I used sales of cellular systems to 
estimate that auction revenues for the two cellular licenses would have been $30 billion. Both of these   
numbers may be subject to criticism, but are used to give an idea of the magnitude of the differential 
between the value of licenses and consumer surplus generated. With discounting, this gives an order of 
magnitude more weight to the consumer surplus than to the private license values. With additional 
competition, the private license values should decrease more as scarcity is lessened” (Rosston 2001, 23).     4
The fundamental issue is consumer welfare: how are service prices ultimately impacted 
by alternative rules?  Efficient license assignments are important to these outcomes, and 
public revenues can generate value, as well.  But where auction rules affect final users, 
output market welfare changes are not only implicated, they are likely to dominate.  
  We hasten to note that Paul Klemperer has correctly diagnosed the temptation to 
favor monopoly rent creation over competitive output markets.  Klemperer (2002b, 185) 
comments on a proposal by Italian regulators (not, in fact, implemented) to eliminate a 
3G
14 license (and the competitor it would empower) in order to raise auction revenues: 
“[T]he approach was fundamentally flawed…it is putting the cart before the horse to 
create an unnecessarily concentrated mobile-phone market to make an auction look 
good” (Ibid.).
15   
  In contrast, however, Klemperer endorses the policy implemented in 3G license 
auctions held in Belgium and Greece in 2001.  Both countries are credited with raising 
incremental revenue by imposing reservation prices.  The result was that each country 
sold three wireless licenses, with a fourth unsold.  Klemperer credits the authorities for 
producing receipts of about 45 Euros per person, counting this as a public financing 
efficiency.  Excluded from the analysis, however, is the fact that each unsold license was 
allocated approximately 35 MHz of bandwidth,
16 and that this frequency space could 
have been productively used by a fourth network (if a willing entrant had come forth at a 
license price of between zero and 45 Euros per capita
17) or divvied up among the three 
(incumbent) networks to expand capacity.   
  After calibrating an empirical model measuring the relationship between 
bandwidth allocated to cellular service and retail prices, we find (and show below) that 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 This focus is highlighted by Paul Milgrom’s analysis of “The Profit and Surplus Contribution of an 
Entrant” (Milgrom 2004, p. 215).  This analyzes producers’ surplus only.  This is reasonable in the context 
of auction rules that are cleanly separated from spectrum allocation, but otherwise misleading. 
14 “3G” refers to “third generation” mobile telephone services, commonly thought to encompass digital 
voice and high-speed data.  First generation consisted of analog voice; second generation of digital voice 
and narrowband data. 
15  Klemperer (2002b, pp. 176 and 178) also (correctly) pronounces the Turkish auction outcome a “fiasco.”  
In auctioning two competing licenses sequentially, regulators set the winning bid for the first license as the 
reservation for the second.  The obvious strategy obtained: the winner of the first auction bid so high that 
no bidder was willing to match the reservation price for the second.   
16  Sources:  Greece: National Telecommunications and Post Commission, Press Release (July 13, 2001), 
http://www.eet.gr/eng_pages/telec/umts/Main.htm Belgium: BIPT, "Communication of the BIPT 
concerning the results of the auction" (March 2, 2001),   http://www.umts.bipt.be/EN/PR%20English.pdf.     5
the welfare cost of withholding spectrum via reservation pricing easily exceeded total 
revenues raised in either Belgium or Greece.  We offer this as one frequently-encountered 
example of how Stage 2 analysis invokes Stage 1 resource allocation and market 
structure decision-making.  The problem is that the auction analysis does not then 
incorporate attendant welfare effects.  We offer a critique of analytical partitioning that is 
asymmetrically broached.  This argument emerges from an empirical study that estimates 
the determinants of consumer welfare in spectrum allocation policy. 
  This analysis focuses on wireless telephone service in twenty-nine countries, of 
which 19 employ auctions to assign licenses.  After adjusting for cross-sectional 
differences in demand and supply, we find that increasing the quantity of spectrum 
available to operators, as well as more intense competitiveness (measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirshmann Index), are strongly associated with lower prices.  We then use the 
coefficient estimates from our model to perform various simulations.  These quantify 
retail market effects associated with various policy changes.  In general, auction rules 
intended to increase license rent extraction by restricting spectrum access are not welfare-
enhancing.  Restricting or delay the use of spectrum inputs is a relatively expensive way 
to raise public funds.   
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we discuss the basic 
framework for regulatory policy evaluation in spectrum.  Section III develops a basic 
theoretical model for wireless telecommunications markets, while Section IV explores 
welfare implications of the model.  Section V reports regression and simulation results. 
Section VI offers a conclusion.   
 
2. Formal Objectives Of Allocation Policy 
 
  Focusing our analysis on the market for wireless telephone service,
18 we assume 
the existence of a regulator who aims to maximize social welfare.
19   We summarize this 
goal in the following objectives: 
                                                                                                                                                 
17  We here exclude the possibility of a subsidy to an entrant. 
18 Not only is wireless telephony the most important market studied by economists analyzing license 
auctions, no rival wireless industry could be studied in such a systematic way.  Note that the Handbook of    6
•  Allocate spectrum to promote the most efficient delivery of wireless services; 
•  Select a mechanism to assign licenses that maximizes social value; 
•  Subject to these constraints, maximize the present value of payments to the 
government. 
 
  The first goal concerns decisions made before licenses are assigned; indeed, it 
encompasses the procedure wherein licenses are created.  Here, the regulator constructs a 
bundle of rights to assign to private parties, and establishes rules shaping industry 
structure and performance, largely determining expected license rents. 
  A less concentrated market structure tends to increase price competition.  Yet, 
scale and/or scope economies may exist, and dynamic (Schumpeterian) efficiencies may 
be improved where relatively efficient firms increase market share.  At a general level, 
fixed and variable costs tend to increase when the amount of spectrum assigned to a 
license is reduced, as happens when additional licenses share a given allocation of 
bandwidth.  Given the costs and benefits of market concentration, our hypothetical 
regulator designs policies aiming to produce an optimal market structure.  
  The second goal is to assign licenses such that total welfare is maximized.  As van 
Damme (2002) comments, this concept, market efficiency, is different from value 
efficiency, which results where licenses go to the players who value them the most.  To 
van Damme, “bidders are guided by shareholder value and not by consumer surplus, or 
total welfare.  Hence, at best one can expect an auction to produce an allocation that is 
‘value efficient,’ it need not be ‘market efficient’” (Ibid., p.7).   Market efficiency might, 
for example, be improved by auction rules discriminating against an incumbent to 
improve post-auction market structure (see Gilbert & Newbery 1982 for an excellent 
discussion of preemptive patenting, directly applicable here). This approach is distinct 
from policy of subsidizing weak bidders in that the discrimination is intended to expand 
efficiency in the output market instead of increasing revenues.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Telecommunications Economics, Vol. I (2002) includes chapters on “Spectrum Auctions” (by Peter 
Cramton) and “Mobile Telephone” (by Jerry Hausman), but otherwise omits analysis of wireless. 
19  For critical analysis of spectrum allocation policy, see: Rosston & Steinberg 1997; White 2000; Hazlett 
2001; Kwerel & Williams 2002; Owen & Rosston 2001; Faulhaber & Farber 2002; Hazlett 2003.    7
  The third goal focuses on raising revenues for public use.  Our assumptions 
isolate this process to one of pure rent transfer.  In this context, higher revenues are 
unambiguously preferred to lower revenues.  In actual policy making, however, the 
assumption is a strong one.   
 
3. A Simple Theoretical Model 
 
  In this section we introduce a simple valuation model which forms the basis for 
our empirical inquiry.  Our goal is to identify the variables that should be included in an 
empirical welfare analysis of spectrum policy.  Consider a market where N firms will be 
producing a homogeneous mobile telephone service, with output levels given by qi where 
i identifies the firm.  We assume there is no initial incumbent.  Aggregate output is given 
by Q q
i
i = ∑ . The market price associated with this output is defined by the inverse 
demand function p(Q).  Firm i has a cost function assumed to adopt the form: 
 
i i i i i q S K c q C ) , ( ) ( =           ( I I I . 1 )  
 
This implies constant marginal cost given a particular level of capital Ki and the amount 
of spectrum Si allocated to the license awarded firm i. When quantity decisions are made, 
capital and spectrum are fixed and the prices paid for these resources sunk. Marginal cost 
is decreasing in capital and spectrum, and these two inputs are substitutes (engineering 
cost models indicate that for a given level of service, as the amount of spectrum [MHz] 
increases, capital expenditure per subscriber declines [Reed 1992, 11-12, 20-21]). 
  The assumption of Cournot competition















S K c Q p
i
i i ε
         ( I I I . 2 )  
 
                                                 













) ( = ε .  
 
  Regulators allocate bandwidth across competitive licenses.  The spectrum allotted 
to a given license can be written as:  S S i i φ = , 1 0 ≤ < i φ  (i.e., each license is allocated a 
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When spectrum allotments are equal across competitive licenses,
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Noting that the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in the case of N identical firms is 
given by 1/N, we interpret the equilibrium equation (III.3) as one where the market price 
depends on the elasticity of demand ε(Q), the level of investment (K), the amount of 
allocated spectrum (S), and a measure of concentration (as a proxy for 1/N).   
  When licenses are assigned by auction, the winning bidder i will offer an amount 







= ≤            ( I I I . 5 )  
where,  
 
Bi = dollar amount bid by firm i, 
πi = expected net income per period for firm i should a license be acquired,
22 
                                                 
21  Given that bandwidth allotments determine costs, equal allotments imply equal market shares.    9
r = discount rate. 
 
In other words, the maximum bid for a license is determined by the profits the resulting 
business opportunity is anticipated to yield.  For simplicity, we characterize the profit 
stream as constant and perpetual.  Discounted present value constitutes an upper bound 







= ,            ( I I I . 6 )  
 
where αi satisfies 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1 and denotes the degree to which the auctioneer extracts 
license rents.  Auction form, interdependent valuations, and the existence of different 
types of bidders (e.g., asymmetric valuations) impact αi.
23  Equation (III.6) permits us to 
see how spectrum policies that create rents affect bids in addition to the auction 
mechanism.  Spectrum policies such as the definition of technology, number of licenses, 
and interconnection rules impact πi.  In traditional auction models the vector of 
valuations (equivalent to a vector of πi) is exogenous. On the other hand, the auction rules 
affect αi.  Thus a higher value for αi implies a more efficient extraction of rents. 
  Given constant marginal costs, expected net income is given by: 
 
[] rK q S K c Q p i i i − − = ) , ( ) ( φ π         ( I I I . 7 )  
                               
By substitution, we obtain: 
24, 25 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
22  When Bi is revealed, capital costs are yet to be sunk and are incorporated into the profit function. 
23  Using standard auction theory we could construct a ranking of revenues for the different auction formats 
depending on the informational structure assumed (see Krishna 2001).  However, the theory assumes that 
the number of players is independent of the auction format.  More importantly, the result is not a social 
ranking, given the difference between market efficiency and value efficiency. 
24  We are assuming that the ex ante net income is positive; otherwise the firm just leaves the auction. 
25 An interesting interpretation of equation (III.8) is the following. Suppose that K represents the present 
value of a program of investment. In order to increase the bid for a license a financially constrained bidder 
could consider postponing his investment plan, reducing K. The net effect of this strategy would be a 
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  Equation (III.9) suggests that bids depend in part on spectrum allocation policy. In 
fact, the same level of expected market revenues, p(Q)Q, is consistent with different 
winning bids.  In general, different market structures (HHI) generate different bids.   The 
effect of auction design is entirely captured by  i α . This is because the number of 
licenses, and the subsequent number of market competitors, has been fixed in the 
spectrum allocation that precedes (and creates) the license auction. 
 
4.   Welfare Implications 
 
  We now turn to the question of how social welfare is affected when some of our 
exogenous variables are modified.   Defining  ∫ =
Q
dx x p Q U
0
) ( ) ( , it can be shown that the 
output at a symmetric Cournot equilibrium with constant marginal costs solves:
26 
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  This expression represents the weighted sum of producers’ surplus and total 
surplus.
27 At one extreme, when N=1,  Cournot competition implies the monopoly 
                                                                                                                                                 
are not going to follow this line of analysis in the present paper, but we are working in a new paper focused 
in this topic. 
26  See Varian (1992, 291).    11
solution, where profits are maximized and market output is QM.  On the other hand, when 
N goes to infinity, the Cournot solution is synonymous with perfect competition (Qc), 
where Qc>QM obtains.  In between, i.e., when QM<Q<Qc, ex post social welfare under 
Cournot competition
28 is trivially increasing in the level of product Q.   Moreover, the 
level of Q under Cournot competition is always in the range QM<Q<Qc and it is 
increasing in N.  
  To illustrate welfare effects of changes in the variables, we establish an inverse 
demand function.  We assume the demand for wireless telephony to be a function of the 
price of wireless service (p), income level (Y), and the price of alternative telephone 
services (F).
29  We posit a constant elasticity of demand function for wireless telephony 
such that: 
 
ε ρ δ λ p F Y Q=          ( I V . 2 )  
 
  Calling Q* the optimal solution in (IV.1), and incorporating the demand function 
defined in (IV.2), yields: 
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Note that when HHI=1 ( HHI=0), the solution for the monopoly (competitive) case 
obtains.  
                                                                                                                                                 
27  These expressions do not include sunk costs.  As bygones, they do not affect the solution in (IV.1).   
28  Ex post means that we are ignoring sunk costs.    12
 Given  that  QM <Q*<Qc, we know that social welfare is increasing in Q*.  From 
(IV.3) we anticipate welfare to be increasing in income (Y) (i.e., we expect  0 > δ ), 
decreasing in marginal cost (c), and decreasing in market concentration (HHI) ( 0 < ε ).  
  Social welfare under Cournot competition can be summarized by: 
 
  K N cQ Q U Q SW − − = * *) ( *) (             ( I V . 4 )  
 
 As  modeled,  SW does not depend on α , the degree of rent extraction in the 
auction.
30  Rather, it strongly depends on the final market structure indicated by the HHI.  
On the other hand, winning auction bids strongly (positively) depend both on α  and the 
Herfindahl index (see eq. [III.9]).  Consequently, the observation of high bids cannot be 
directly interpreted as welfare enhancing because such receipts could result from high 
concentration in the output market, which may decrease social welfare, rather than from a 
high value of  i α , which is neutral in terms of social welfare.
31  
  It is interesting to note that both HHI and α  are largely the product of regulatory 
design. A high value for α  is obtained when the auction mechanism selected prevents 
collusion, entry-deterring and predatory behavior.  On the other hand, regulatory 
decisions over the number of licenses and spectrum allocation, as well as rules governing 
services offered, business models utilized by operators, and technologies deployed will 
heavily influence market structure and its proxy, the Herfindahl index.  Marginal costs (in 
the previous model) are a function of sunk investments in spectrum and capital, where 
) , ( S K c c i φ =  is assumed to be decreasing in the amount of allocated spectrum and the 
level of capital investment.     
  We may now evaluate the effect of spectrum policy.  Suppose that the regulatory 
authority decides to increase bandwidth allocated to each license by an equal increment, 
keeping constant the number of licenses and leaving the auction mechanism unchanged.  
                                                                                                                                                 
29    Fixed and mobile telephony services are not necessarily substitutes, so the sign of ρ  is ambiguous. 
30  Note that we are studying this market in a partial equilibrium analysis.  The public finance social 
benefits of license auctions stem from the opportunity to reduce distortions in other markets.  Analytically, 
those benefits (from reduced distortions) are accounted for separately. 
31  Higher values of αi could positively impact welfare if achieved in a non-distorting way.   In the 
empirical section we return to this issue.
    13
This action decreases marginal cost.  Thus, recalling Equation (IV.3), it is clear that Q* 
increases and P* decreases, leading SW to rise.  However, spectrum and capital are 
substitutes and, when bids are made, capital is not yet sunk.  Accordingly, if larger 
spectrum bands are allotted licenses, the capital requirements of prospective network 
operators (i.e., bidders in the auction) decline.  Less investment is necessary to achieve 
the same marginal cost.   This effect also increases welfare.    
  The effect on bids is less clear.  From equation (III.9) it is seen that price declines 
and quantity increases in response to an expanded spectrum allocation, yet the effect over 
the first term in the brackets is ambiguous.  However, lower capital requirements tend to 
increase license bids. Engineering studies suggest that for relatively narrow bandwidth 
licensees, the substitution effect between capital and spectrum is strong.   The effect 
diminishes at higher levels of bandwidth.   It is then plausible that bids, as a function of 
spectrum, exhibit an inverted U shape.
32  Nevertheless, increased spectrum allotments are 
always social welfare improving.
33 
 Increasing  N, the number of licenses, produces ambiguous results.  Expanding the 
number of firms increases competition, ceteris paribus. However, two negative effects are 
likely. First, the amount of spectrum assigned to each license decreases, increasing 
marginal costs. Second, the number of networks to be built increases, each network 




5. Estimation And Predictions Of The Model 
 
Estimation Of The Model 
  The empirical implementation of our model is based on the estimation of a log-
log version of equation (III.3) (The Mark Up equation) and a log-log demand function 
(eq. (IV.2)).  Both include nonlinear terms.  The basic system is given by: 
                                                 
32  Some empirical evidence on this effect has been found in Hazlett 2004. 
33 This does not say that more bandwidth should always be allocated to a particular service, which incurs 
opportunity costs in alternative markets. 
34 In reality, investment costs are not always additive.  Firms may share towers, transport facilities, 
switches, or other physical infrastructure.  Accordingly, the cost of capital can be approximated by a    14
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where i denotes the country and t the period.  Variables are as follows: 
 
RPM    Revenue per minute in US$ for mobile voice services, a proxy for price. 
 
Q    Output, measured as total minutes of use (totmin).  Units are in millions. 
 
HHI    Herfindahl-Hirshman Index in the market (0 to 10,000). 
 
Spectrum  Aggregate bandwidth available for mobile phone service by all 
    operators in the market.  Measured in MHz. 
 
Density  A proxy for capital investment.  Measured as mean inhabitants per square 
  kilometer. 
 
Auction  Dummy variable = 1 if wireless licenses awarded via auction; 0 elsewise. 
   
Notcpp   Dummy variable = 1 if the market not using calling party pays rule. 
 
Gdppc   Gross Domestic Product per capita in US$. 
 
Fixprice  Mean price of 3-minute call in US$ using fixed network (peak period). 
                                                                                                                                                 
function K(N), so the total cost would be N*K(N).  Although this may change the optimal number of 
licenses, it does not alter the qualitative analysis.     15
 
  (V.1) and (V.2) represent a system of equations in the endogenous variables 
ln(RPM) and ln(totmin).  We used an instrumental variable approach to estimate the 
model using panel data.  Output was considered endogenous and was instrumented by 
regressing Ltotmin against all the independent variables.
35  Predicted values were then 
used to perform the final estimation.  Data are quarterly from 1999-I through 2003-II for 
wireless telephone markets in 29 countries provided by Merrill Lynch (2003).  A detailed 
description of the sample is given in Appendix 1.  For summary statistics see Table V.1.   
  The first two columns in Table V.2 display the final results achieved from 
estimating the system of equations V.1 and V.2.  The third column features first stage 
results, which come from the instrumental variable regression.  Some squared terms were 
dropped from the reported specification due to high collinearity with the variables in 
levels.  In each case our approach was to estimate the full model and to then evaluate the 
joint significance of these highly collinear variables using a chi square test.  In some 
cases we could reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients were jointly zero at the 5% 
level of confidence, so we dropped the squared term while retaining the linear term.
36  In 
other cases, however, we could not reject the hypothesis that the coefficients were jointly 
zero, and dropped both.
37 
  The estimated demand function exhibits negative slope, and willingness to pay is 
positively related to GDP per capita, although at a decreasing rate.  The significance of 
Ltotminhat2 in the demand equation makes the elasticity of demand a function of total 
minutes, which is consistent with the observed dependence of the mark up equation in 
total minutes.  This is because the theoretical mark up equation only depends on the 
quantity proxy through the elasticity of demand; with constant elasticity, we expect 
quantity proxies to be insignificant.   
  While the purpose of this exercise is not to measure demand elasticities, we report 
that the model’s estimates range from -1.71 to -3.62.  These are higher than reported 
                                                 
35   Ignoring this endogeneity problem leads to inconsistent estimators.  
36   This was the case with  Lspectrum2 in Table V.2 for the instrumental variable regression. 
37  This was the case for for Lfixprice and Lfixprice2 in the regression for the instrument in Table V.2.  On 
the other hand, we could not reject the joint insignificance of Lfixprice and Lfixprice2 in the Demand 
equation V.2, yet decided to retain the variables on theoretical grounds.    16
elsewhere,
38 which may owe to the pooled, international data used in this study. When a 
constant elasticity is imposed, elasticity is estimated to equal -2.23. The most important 
coefficients in the Mark Up equation for LHHI, LHHI2, Lspectrum and Lspectrum2 are 
robust to this modification in the model (they change slightly to 60.549, -3.48, -1.1886 
and 0.0532, respectively). The level of significance was the same as in the original 
model. 
  The absence of calling party pays appears to shrink the demand curve.  On the 
other hand, we do not find a significant effect on demand and equilibrium prices given a 
change in the price of calls over the fixed network.  Countries with higher GDP per capita 
do not appear to have a corresponding increase in output, even as their willingness to pay 
is higher.  Prices are decreasing for relatively low density values, but are then increasing.  
The inflexion occurs at about 200 inhabitants per square kilometer.    
  A surprising result is that the estimated coefficient on the auction dummy is 
positive and significant in the mark up regression. That suggests that consumers in 
countries using auctions to assign wireless licenses tend to pay higher rates, ceteris 
paribus.  We note, however, that output does not appear negatively affected by the use of 
auctions (in the instrumental regression).  A higher price with no significant effect on 
output is consistent with a number of explanations, including the conclusion that license 
auctions have no systematic impact on output markets. 
  The mark up equation results suggest that the equilibrium price in the market 
increases with the Herfindahl-Hirshmann Index, but decreases with the amount of 
spectrum allocated to mobile services.  These results are statistically significant, and are 
consistent with economic theory.  It is expected that more competitive markets feature 
lower service prices, while expanded availability of radio spectrum lowers both fixed 
costs and variable operating expense.  Lower fixed costs encourage entry, which could 
lower price by increasing competitiveness (accounted for by the HHI variable), while the 
latter reduces marginal costs, leading directly to lower prices. 
  The estimation of the instrument illuminates the most important issue addressed 
herein. Higher levels of concentration, measured by the HHI, are associated with output 
                                                 
38  Ingraham and Sidak (2004) have estimated that the elasticity of demand in US for wireless services is 
between -1.12 and -1.29.      17
decreasing at a decreasing rate.  Increasing aggregate radio spectrum available to wireless 
networks is associated with higher levels of output.  In our theoretical model this occurs 
due to reduced marginal costs and/or because greater bandwidth allocations increase 
licenses issued by regulators.  
 
The Role Of Spectrum Policy 
 
Price Effect 
  To gain improved understanding of the relationship between allocated spectrum 
and price per minute, we performed simulations using the model reported in Table V.2.  
We fixed all the other exogenous variables in logs at their mean values, and then varied 
the quantity of spectrum (in MHz) allotted to the mobile telephony sector.  The estimated 
parameters derived in the previous sub-section are then used to predict the effect on price 
and output, permitting social welfare changes to be calculated. 
  Figure V.1 displays results.  Price is decreasing in the amount of allocated 
spectrum, with the rate of decrease declining.  Retail prices are reduced both because 
costs are lower with more abundant inputs, and because market concentration tends to be 
lower in markets with higher spectrum allocations. 
 
Welfare Effect 
  A related question concerns what happens to social welfare when additional 
spectrum is allocated for use.  We performed simulations using the model in Table V.2 to 
address this.  We simulate a “country like” scenario to evaluate the impact on consumer 
and producer surplus related to an exogenous increase in spectrum allocated the market in 
20, 80, 140 and 200 MHz increments. 
  Expanded spectrum availability is negatively related to the Herfindahl-Hirshman 
Index (HHI). In order to incorporate this effect, we performed a log-log regression 
between the HHI and all the exogenous variables identified in Table V.2.  The resulting 
estimated of the HHI-Spectrum elasticity was -0.124, significant at the one percent level.  
We use this elasticity to modify the HHI according to the assumed Spectrum increase.  
The simulation proceeds as follows.    18
 
1.  Initial values are assumed for the exogenous variables, creating “country like” 
scenarios.  Using our model’s parameter estimates, the instrument is calculated; the 
mark-up equation then yields the expected RPM in the benchmark case. 
 
2.  An increase in Spectrum is assumed, say 80 MHz, the corresponding HHI is 
obtained through the HHI-Spectrum elasticity, and the model is used to predict the 
new RPM.  From the percentage change in RPM and the demand elasticity at the 
initial level of output (total minutes), we then estimate the change in output. 
 
3.  Given the change in prices and output we get the expected change in Consumer 
Surplus and Producer Surplus (per month).
39  We estimate the net present values, 
assuming these flows to be a perpetuity having a net annual discount rate of 5%.
40   
 
  Figures V.2 show the results for a simulation approximating conditions found in a 
country like the U.K. in the first quarter of 2000 – “The Biggest Auction Ever.”
41 
Licenses allocated 140 MHz of spectrum are assumed to be auctioned in our simulation.   
British 3G licenses, also allocated an aggregate of 140 MHz, sold for approximately $34 
billion; applying the $0.33-per-dollar public financing bonus implies social gains of about 
$11.3 billion.  Our simulation suggests, in comparison, that about $60 billion in consumer 
surplus gains were realized from the 140 MHz of radio spectrum being made available to 
operators.  This increase in surplus dominates the benefits associated with tax efficiency.  
This outcome is illuminating precisely because the British 3G auctions are widely 
considered to be the most successful example of license rent extraction. 
  Alternatively, consider the U.S. market for wireless telephony.  Using parameters 
obtained in our cross-country pricing model, we simulate an increase of 60 MHz in 
spectrum allocated for mobile telephony.  This is associated with a decline in retail prices 
                                                 
39 To transform incremental revenues into producers’ surplus we use the EBITDA index reported by Merrill 
Lynch (2003).  Only operating profits are included as incremental surplus. 
40 This can be thought of as a real social discount rate.  Since growth is expected for many years in wireless 
phone markets, it is not implausible that even if the (gross) discount rate is ten percent, that a net discount 
rate of 5% (reflecting anticipated growth of five percent) would be appropriate.  
41  As Ken Binmore and Paul Klemperer referenced it in the title of their 2002 article.    19
of about 20 percent – from approximately 11 cents per minute of use (as registered in 
2003) to about nine cents per MOU.  A price drop of this magnitude is, in turn, associated 
with an increase in consumer surplus of about $24 billion annually.     
  Given marginal license valuations of about $1.65/MHz/pop,
42 the capitalized 
value of nationwide licenses allocated 60 MHz (even under the strong assumption that 
marginal valuations do not decline over the incremental increase) is about $27 billion.  If 
the public finance dividend applies, the tax efficiency gain of $9 billion is dominated by 
the annual gains associated with increased output.  In fact, a delay of less than six months 
would swamp the public financing bonus altogether.   
 
•  Reservation Prices in Belgium and Greece 
  Of Belgian and Greek auctions held in 2001, Klemperer (2002a, 840) writes:   
“Both countries held auctions for four licenses – and in each case attracted only the three 
incumbents, who therefore obtained licenses at the reserve prices which yielded about 45 
Euros per capita in each case. It is very hard to argue plausibly that an auction deterred 
much entry when a license goes unsold, and there is also no obvious reason to criticise 
the reserve prices that these governments chose.”  
  Our model helps analyze these arguments. First, reserve prices help to increase 
revenues for the auctioneer.  But the incremental revenue is not without social cost; the 
spectrum allocated to unsold licenses reduces operator efficiency and, perhaps, market 
competitiveness.  While the latter implies that network entry would have occurred if the 
license were priced below the reserve level, the former does not.  In this example, if each 
incumbent’s license were allocated 1/3 the bandwidth allocated the fourth, lower 
marginal and capital costs would have resulted. 
  Figure V.3 shows the effect of withholding a license by the use of reservation 
prices in Belgium and Greece.  In our simulations we assume either  
 
                                                 
42  Current license valuations are observed in secondary market sales of raw PCS (personal communications 
services) C Block licenses in 2003-04, pursuant to the long legal dispute concerning NextWave.  The 
company’s licenses are worth approximately $6.5 billion (see Gregory Zuckerman and Geoffrey Drucker, 
NextWave Spectrum Could Figure In Some Future Telecom Megadeal, Wall Street Journal (March 2, 
2004)). Covering areas with 166 million residents, and being allocated an average of 23.5 MHz,  this 
implies valuation around $1.65 per MHz per capita.    20
  (1) an entrant, at license price = 0, builds a fourth network; or  
  (2) no rival enters, but spectrum allocated the 4
th license is utilized by incumbents.   
 
  The change in consumer surplus estimated under the 1
st (new entrant) scenario is 
“DCS1”; the estimated change in consumer surplus under the 2
nd (spectrum reallocation) 
scenario is “DCS2.”  These changes, negative given that spectrum is being withheld by 
the reserve price policy, are compared to the positive welfare effects associated with 
auction revenues.  Here we attribute all receipts to the reserve price policy, which 
generates government revenues of “Rev.”, and assume that one-third of such revenues 
constitute social savings due to reduced activity-distorting taxation, identified as “S.V. 
Rev.”. 
  According to the simulation performed with model estimated above, the spectrum 
withholding losses are greater when it is assumed that a new entrant would materialize at 
reserve = 0 (i.e., DCS1>DCS2 for both the Belgian and Greek markets).  This implies, 
not surprisingly, that the spectrum is used most efficiently by an entrant (abstracting from 
the cost of capital).   The comparison of interest is between either DCS estimate and SV 
Rev.  Focusing on DCS2, the lower “value of spectrum” estimate reveals that social 
losses from the reserve policy are about twelve times the magnitude of expected public 
financing gains in Belgium, and about four times higher in Greece.  This suggests that 
radio spectrum is severely under-allocated by virtue of the reserve price policy, giving 
economists ample reason for criticism. 
 
•  Subsidizing Weak Bidders in U.S. PCS Auctions 
  Finally, consider the personal communications service (PCS) C-block auctions 
which concluded in May 1996.  U.S. regulators extended bidding credits to small 
businesses and rural telephone companies, allowing qualified (that is, weak) bidders to 
pay for licenses over ten years, paying below-market interest rates.  The PCS licenses 
were allocated 30 MHz of nationwide radio spectrum.   
  Bidding for licenses was intense; C-block winners committed to paying more than 
twice the price paid by winners of similar A and B licenses the year previous, after 
netting out credits and subsidies (Hazlett & Boliek 1999).  Yet, service was not provided;    21
in fact, bids went uncollected.  The overwhelming majority of licensees soon declared 
bankruptcy, effectively defaulting on long-term obligations to the federal government, 
while retaining control of the licenses.  Through May 2004, allocated spectrum – nearly 
one-sixth the total bandwidth allocated to mobile phone service -- went unused.   
  Our empirical model can be used to estimate the cost of this loss of bandwidth in 
the wireless telephone market.  If additional licenses for cellular service had been allowed 
to utilize another 30 MHz of radio spectrum, consumer surplus (excluding supply-side 
effects) over the eight year period, 1996-2003, would have increased by an estimated $39 
billions (using 2004 dollars).  See Table V.3. This dominates any plausible public 
financing gains from tinkering with auction design.  In fact, aggregate revenues collected 
for all U.S. wireless licenses, 1994-2002, amounted to just $14 billion.
43  
  The term “fiasco” been applied to auction regimes that generate relatively low 
bids, but we see the FCC bidding preferences as equally, or more, deserving of the term.  
Yet, these preferences serve the economics literature as a paradigmatic example of how 
to intensify bidding by subsidizing weak bidders.  Social costs of favoring less efficient 
providers are seen to be dominated by public financing gains from revenue extraction: 
“partially subsidizing disadvantaged bidders, generally, more than compensates for the 
cost of the subsidy due to increased aggressiveness by first-line bidders” (Rothkopf et al., 
2003, 82).  This conclusion follows from an analysis that is “complementary to Ayres and 
Cramton (1996),” which found “that a subsidy policy can sometimes materially benefit 
the bidtaker” (Rothkopf et al., 2003, 72).  Specifically, Ayres and Cramton found that 
1994 FCC bidding credits generated net revenues.  But the overwhelming loss of welfare 
in the 1996 PCS auction credits does not enter the policy analysis. While the 
government’s credit policies proved faulty,
44  the salient fact for welfare analysis of 
                                                 
43 Reported totals, often as high as $40 billion, count uncollected and/or uncollectible bids.  Source: The 
Budget for Fiscal Year 2003, Appendix, Federal Communications Commission, Status of Direct Loans, 
1122. 
44 FCC Chairman Michael Powell believes that, as reported in the trade press: “the FCC learned its lesson 
from the NextWave/C-block debacle and will no longer auction off licenses using installment payments.”  
Heather Forsgren Weaver, RCR WIRELESS NEWS, NextWave Must Shed Most of Its Spectrum Under FCC 
Settlement (April 20, 2004).    22






Policy errors are also less likely when expertise is not too narrowly 
focused in one subdiscipline – for example, auction designers should 
remember their industrial economics and political economy (at least) in 
addition to pure auction theory (Klemperer 2004, p. 147) 
 
  Auctions are generally superior to alternative rights-assignment mechanisms such 
as beauty contests or lotteries.
46  Wireless License auctions appear to assign licenses to 
the most efficient network operators,
47 and to have limited rent dissipation associated 
with more arbitrary assignment methods.  Yet, auction rules developed to optimize the 
social gains associated with licensing conflict with the goal of maximizing social welfare.  
  Formal economic analysis, which rigorously defines the relevant trade-offs for 
policy makers, has often tended to obscure regulatory choices.  While revenue gains from 
enhanced competitive bidding are registered as leading directly to increase efficiency in 
offsetting activity-distorting taxes, the costs of such policies are often dismissed as 
inconsequential or ignored altogether.  This is seen frequent policy proposals 
recommending the use of reservation prices and bidding credits for inefficient wireless 
providers, as well as in the omission of time value when comparing alternative policy 
regimes.   
  Using a panel dataset involving 29 countries and quarterly data from January 
1999 to June 2003, we identify the determinants of social welfare in mobile telephony 
                                                 
45 Ayres and Cramton (1996, 11) discuss the possibility that licensees will default on long-term debt 
obligations, but dismiss its empirical significance: "If a designated bidder defaulted, the government could 
easily foreclose and resell the licenses, but their resale value would be uncertain." 
46 Even before competitive bidding for FCC licenses were authorized in the United States, one of the 
authors of this paper participated in the policy debate, writing in favor of auctions (Hazlett, Making Money 
Out of the Air, N EW YORK TIMES [Dec. 2, 1987]; Hazlett, Dial 'G' for Giveaway, BARRON’S [June 4, 
1990]).   
47 Although, to our knowledge, the challenging argument put forth by Severin Borenstein (1988), which 
noted that assigning rights via competitive bidding might not result in greater efficiency in that producers’ 
surplus is not perfectly correlated with consumers’ surplus, has never been tested in the wireless market.      23
markets. We find that the amount of allocated spectrum, and the degree of market 
competitiveness, appears to be most important in determining social welfare.  Policies 
that increase competition and permit the spectrum market to operate more efficiently 
empirically dominate in spectrum regulation.  This includes liberal allocations making 
radio spectrum abundantly available for productive deployment, as well as other rules 
allowing competitors to operate efficiently.
48  Auction rules that create regulatory 
spillovers and risk inflicting collateral consumer welfare damage are judged to be 
generally inefficient. 
  Yet, the economic analysis of wireless license auctions has focused largely on 
revenues extracted from bidders, seeing the “embarrassingly low revenue in the 
Netherlands,” for example, as indicating a fiasco in public policy (Wolfstetter 2001, 6; 
citing Klemperer 2000).    It might also be noted that the Dutch have succeeded in 
making 355 MHz available for wireless phone operators – more than any other EU 
country.   Alternatively, U.S. regulators have made less than 189 MHz of bandwidth 
available for use in wireless telephone markets, an outcome that merits little academic 














                                                 
48 One important set of issues not investigated in our model pertains to technology mandates.  Competition 
between competing wireless telephone standards (as in the United States) is thought be some to have 
produced better technology (e.g., CDMA) and more intense rivalry.  Others see the harmonization policy of 
the EU as a successful technology mandate.  See Gandal et al., 2003.    24
TABLE V.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
                
  Variable   Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max   
                
 totmin  (MM/Month)    488  2788.72  8057.09  70.89  78338.39   
 RPM  (US$)    470  0.21  0.08  0.07  0.62   
 HHI  (1-10000)    522  3900.69  1058.25  1648  6458   
 spectrum  (MHz)    522  179.46  97.63  36.4  530   
 density  (hab./sq.  kms.)    522  536.42  1633.80  2.46 6832.46   
 auction  (0-1)    522  0.66  0.48  0  1   
 notcpp  (0-1)    522  0.14  0.35  0  1   
 gdppc  (US$/year)    522  18464.56  10460.90  1723  47316   
 fixprice  (US$)    504  0.10  0.05  1.80E-35  0.193548   
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TABLE V.2: LOG-LOG RESULTS. DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 
LN(RPM). 
ALL ESTIMATIONS USE A RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL. 
 





































































































No.Observations  469 451 488 
R-Square  Within  0.4296 0.6455 0.6409 
R-Square Between   0.3717  0.1073  0.4353 
R-Square  Overall  0.3773 0.1374 0.4134 
Two Stage IV estimation in Panel Data. Values of z-statistics in parentheses: *, **, *** refer to 99%, 95%, 
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TABLE V. 3: WELFARE COSTS OF WEAK BIDDER  
SUBSIDIES IN U.S. PCS AUCTIONS 
 
year delta CS inflation rate Adjusted delta CS
(US$ MM) (US$ MM, 2004) 
1996 847.2 2.9 1022.1
1997 1060.2 2.3 1243.0
1998 1543.1 1.5 1768.5
1999 2518.8 2.2 2780.0
2000 4055.7 3.4 4480.7
2001 6456.6 2.8 6898.7
2002 9168.8 1.6 9529.8
2003 11262.3 2.3 11521.4
Total 39244.2
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FIGURE I.1:  SEPARATING SPECTRUM ALLOCATION AND 
LICENSE AUCTIONS 
 
           Stage 1             ==Æ        Stage 2    ==Æ   Stage 3 
Spectrum Allocation          License assignment            Retail Market 
Wireless licenses created    Auction rules             Prices, outputs 
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FIGURE V.2: EFFECT ON CONSUMER SURPLUS OF INCREASES  
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FIGURE V.3: WELFARE EFFECT OF WITHHOLDING  























Auction date 2001/Q1 2001/Q3
extra license (MHz) 35.4 35
change in price (%) -4.59% -3.62%
change in MOU (%) 7.27% 5.73%
change in CS1 (extra operator) US$ MM -2243.66 -1055.32
change in CS2 (current operators) US$ MM -1603.16 -636.83
total rev. in auction US$ MM 408.92 434.96






  SIMULATION SCENARIO 
 
  
COUNTRY TO BE SIMULATED: TYPE 1 (LIKE UK) 
 
 units  start  end 
     
totmin MM/month 4574   
HHI 0-10000  2600  implied 
spectrum MHz  200 variable 
density hab./sq(km)  241  241 
auction 0-1  1  1 
notcpp 0-1  0  0 
gdppc US$  25000  25000 
fixprice  US$ 0.18 0.18 
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Appendix 1:  Mobile Voice Market Database 
 
Our main source of information was: 
 
“Global Wireless Matrix 2Q03: Quarterly Update on Global Wireless Industry Metrics,” 
Merrill Lynch Global Securities Research & Economics Group, Global Fundamental 
Equity Research Department. This includes quarterly data for the wireless market in 46 
countries, fourth quarter 1998 through second quarter 2003.  All data were obtained from 
this source except the following: 
 
 
Spectrum, Auction:  The main source is each country’s telecommunications regulator and 
Communications Ministry. The Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire database, the 
European Commission and the European Radio Communications Office are secondary 
sources. 
 
GDPPC (GDP per capita): International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) Database. April 2003. 
 
Density: It was constructed as population/area, where population is from Merrill Lynch 
and area is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2003. 
 
Fixprice: It was taken from the International Telecommunications Union’s World 
Telecommunications Indicators 2002 database. 
 
 
Our sample is comprised of all observations in the Merrill Lynch database for which we 
have data for all the relevant variables from the first quarter in 1999 through the second 
quarter in 2003.  (While Merrill Lynch data begin in fourth quarter 1998, the data listed 































Venezuela    31
Of the 46 countries in the Merrill Lynch database, many could not be used due to missing 
data (for variables not included in the ML database).  The most difficult data to identify 
included Spectrum and Fixprice.  To enable the inclusion of additional country data, 
Fixprice was adjusted in the following countries: 
 
•  Canada: The reported values are zero from 1991 to 1994; thereafter it is not 
reported.  We used an assumed value of “0” after 1994.  
 
•  Sweden: The value increases monotonically until 1999; it is not reported 
thereafter.  We used the variable with missing values (i.e., data from Sweden was 
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